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INTRODUCTION
Active shooter incidents, a subcategory of mass casualty 
incidents (MCI), while relatively rare, are increasing in 
the United States (US). The average of 11.4 active shooter 
incidents between 2000-2013 increased to 20 each year 
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Introduction: Emergency departments (ED) are on the front line for treating victims of multi-casualty 
incidents. The primary objective of this study was to gather and detail the common experiences from 
those hospital-based health professionals directly involved in the response to the San Bernardino 
terrorism attack on December 2, 2015. Secondary objectives included gathering information on 
experiences participants found were best practices.  
Methods: We undertook a qualitative study using Consolidated Criteria for Reporting Qualitative 
Research (COREQ) guidelines by performing semi-structured interviews with physicians, nurses, 
and incident management staff from multiple institutions responding to the San Bernardino terrorist 
attack. We coded transcripts using qualitative analysis techniques and we delineated and agreed 
upon a refined list with code definitions using a negotiated group process. Final themes were 
developed and analyzed. 
Results: A total of 26 interviews were completed; 1172 excerpts were coded and categorized into 66 
initial themes. Six final categories of communication, training, unexpected help, process bypassed, 
personal impact/emotions, and practical advice resulted.
Conclusion: Our study provides context regarding the response of healthcare personnel from 
multiple institutions to a singular terrorist attack in the United States. It elucidates several themes 
to help other institutions prepare for similar events. Understanding these common experiences 
provides opportunity to prepare for future incidents and develop questions to study in future events.  
[West J Emerg Med. 2020;21(2)382-390.]
2014-2016, and 30 in 2017.1,2 Casualty numbers during 
2016-2017 were higher than prior years due to the incidents 
at the Route 91 Harvest Festival in Las Vegas, NV, Pulse 
Nightclub in Orlando, FL, and the First Baptist Church in 
Sutherland Springs, TX.3 MCIs are “an imbalance between the 
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Population Health Research Capsule 
What do we already know about this issue?
Mass casualty incident (MCI) responses 
push the limits of individual hospital based 
providers. Institutional preparation is essential 
as incident numbers increase.
What was the research question?
What common experiences of hospital providers 
directly involved in a terrorist response inform 
improvements in MCI planning?
What was the major finding of the study?
Common Experience: communication, 
training, unexpected aid, process bypass, 
personal impact, practical advice.
How does this improve population health?
Insights inform improvements in MCI planning 
at both individual & institution level. Planning 
for after event processing is essential to 
support clinical providers.
numbers of injured who need medical care and the medical 
ability of emergency systems to deliver optimal care to each 
individual.”4 In the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing, 118 
people were transported to nine hospitals in 18 minutes with 
more than 264 seeking treatment.5 During the response to the 
Route 91 Harvest Festival mass shooting incident in 2017, 
the University Medical Center of Southern Nevada cared for 
104 patients, Sunrise Hospital and Medical Center received 
212 patients, and St. Rose Dominican Hospital cared for 37 
patients.6 Hospitals must prepare for MCIs.4,7-10
On December 2, 2015, a terrorist attack in San Bernardino 
killed 14 and injured 22. Incident details were described in an 
earlier publication.11 The response involved six local hospitals 
in a regional network, the Inland Counties Emergency Medical 
Agency, 12 using ReddiNet13 (ReddiNet, Los Angeles CA), 
a communications network (Table 1). Previous studies have 
illuminated hospital responses to terrorist attacks.14-16 Common 
experiences of individual health professionals responding to a 
singular event are less well understood.
Importance
Understanding common experiences of health professionals 
from different medical centers responding to the same, singular 
terrorist attack may provide new insights into shared challenges, 
best practices, and lead to questions worthy of additional 
study. Our study is the largest qualitative study of healthcare 
professionals responding to terrorism in the US. Previous studies 
have focused on attacks in Europe or Israel, or on responders 
other than physicians and nurses (i.e., social workers).17,18
Goals of This Investigation
Our primary objective was to gather and detail the common 
experiences from those hospital-based health professionals 
directly involved in the response to the San Bernardino terrorism 
attack. Secondary objectives included gathering information on 
experiences participants found were best practices. The analysis 
of this information should allow professionals to generate 
questions for further study as well as review and improve their 
current MCI planning.
METHODS
Study Design and Setting
We undertook a qualitative study using Consolidated Criteria 
for Reporting Qualitative Research (COREQ) guidelines by 
performing semi-structured interviews with physicians, nurses, 
and incident management staff from multiple institutions 
responding to the San Bernardino terrorist attack.19-21 We chose 
this approach because terrorist attacks on US civilian targets 
are relatively rare and the inductive approach uncovers a deeper 
understanding of elusive or unexpected responses to clinical 
problems by allowing for probing questions.22,23 The Loma Linda 
Resource hospitals Service area
Loma Linda University Emergency Department Level I Trauma, Adult and Pediatric Patients
Arrowhead Regional Medical Center Level II Trauma, San Bernardino County
Riverside University Health System Hospital Level II Trauma, Riverside County
St. Bernardine’s Medical Center, San Antonio Regional 
Hospital, and Kaiser Permanente Fontana Medical Center
Community hospitals
Inland Counties Emergency Medical Agency (ICEMA) Regional Disaster Response System. Oversees prehospital services in 
the area and provides opportunities for collaboration and integration.
REDDINET Emergency medical communications network links hospitals, first 
responders, law enforcement, and public health assets.
Table 1. Responder resources to the San Bernardino mass shooting.
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University Institutional Review Board approved the study as 
exempt. Participants provided verbal consent.
Selection of Participants and Data Collection and Processing
Three emergency physicians and one public health PhD, 
trained in qualitative approaches, interviewed participants. We 
used purposive and then snowball sampling to select participants 
whereby we contacted facility medical directors and asked them 
to provide a list of potential interviewees. We recruited from 
multiple distinct hospitals to achieve data source triangulation, 
building a comprehensive and thorough model by using diverse 
data sources by recruiting.23 Interviews were conducted at 
participant’s hospital or by phone, per interviewee’s choice, 
January 13, 2016 – March 17, 2016, using a standardized 
interview guide (Table 2). All interviews were audiotaped and 
then transcribed by paid transcriptionists. Interviews lasted 
between 13-60 minutes with a median of 31 minutes. We 
interviewed until theoretical saturation was achieved as no new 
relevant ideas were mentioned by additional participants. Another 
indication of saturation was repetitive themes that supported the 
resulting model. 22, 24 We analyzed data using DEDOOSE version 
7.5.16 (Los Angeles, CA).
Primary Data Analysis 
Researchers independently coded four transcripts using 
qualitative analysis techniques.22 We refined the list using a 
negotiated group process until code definitions were delineated 
and agreed upon. We developed final themes using an inductive 
process over multiple meetings. Once themes were identified, 
team members performed additional data analysis together to 
identify relevant contrarian viewpoints found within the themes.  
Study participants did not provide feedback, but we included de-
identified quotations emblematic of the discovered themes.
RESULTS
Characteristics of Study Subjects
We completed 26 interviews with hospital-based responders 
(Table 3). One hospital system treating only one patient 
declined participation. Interview coding produced 1172 excerpts 
categorized into 66 initial themes, which collapsed to six general 
categories: communication, training, unexpected help, processes 
bypassed, personal impact/emotions, and practical advice. 
Main Results 
Active shooter incidents challenge traditional communication 
channels.
Active shooter incidents present challenges of scale and 
function by occurring unexpectedly, demanding resources that 
are not typically available on a regular day, and challenging 
pre-identified hierarchies and defined job descriptions. Study 
participants used multiple communication methods, including 
REDDINET, in- person conversations, handheld hospital 
“disaster phones” distributed for MCIs, two-way pagers, and 
work or personal cell phones for voice and texting. Additional 
resources included television, hospital computers, social media, 
and other phone apps to stream news reports. Despite using 
multiple communication methods, participants reported having an 
incomplete picture of what to expect. 
Initially we got a lot more information, we were just trying to 
gather more information. The first call they said that it was 
10-20 victims we didn’t know if they were coming to us, or 
how many or if all of them were coming to us.
I don’t know what’s coming in. I didn’t even know if it was a 
patient themselves or the shooter. It could have been either of 
them. No one knew anything.
Many respondents reported trusting information using peer-
to-peer (PTP) methods such as text and Facebook messages. 
PTP methods seemed weighted more than other communication 
methods, especially when the messenger was a personal 
acquaintance. Physicians promptly responded to the PTP requests 
for resources, including residents at the trauma centers. It was an 
education day at two locations so many residents were on site. 
Administrative response was quick at all locations. For example, 
it was clear that administrators intervened to move patients up to 
floors to open ED beds for potential victims. On the other hand, 
the administrative response also increased ED traffic leading to 
potential confusion about who was in charge. The large number 
of available physicians created the potential for confusing 
communication.
For instance one of my colleagues was astute enough to 
recognize our communication difficulties; some of the 
leadership drifting around the campus, whether they were 
out in the parking lot or central supply or CAT scan or 
whatever, did not have direct communication with each 
other. So she secured more handsets, more mobile handsets 
so the leadership could talk amongst each other directly. 
The rest of us gained more supplies and prepared each room 
for whatever might come. It was both direct and indirect 
leadership. We got direction and then we self-assigned some 
of our own duty.
Hospital personnel streaming news on their office computers 
led to Internet system degradation. Ultimately clinicians 
depended on a combination of their own judgment and leadership 
messages to make patient care decisions.
So they were getting private phone calls and private texts 
from outside sources; who knows if they were actually on 
the scene? They were listening to their radio or texts from a 
friend. So all kinds of external stuff were coming but none of 
it was correct either. And then that was causing the nurses 
and staff down here to continue to follow whatever media 
station they could catch on their cell reception or the Wi-Fi 
reception we had here and that did not work well at all.
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Demographics How long have you been at your medical center?
How many years have you been in the emergency department?
Where did you do your training?
How old are you?
What is your gender?
Grand Tour Question Tell me about that day.
Overall Framing What was your job title that day? (prompt: medical director, doctor on duty, nurse on duty, tech, etc.)
Process & Logistics What worked well?
What didn’t work well? Was there anything that didn’t work well?
Was there anything you weren’t prepared for?
Has anything changed in the emergency department as a result of these events?
Disaster Plan Did you activate your disaster plan and if so, how did it go?
Were you able to move low acuity patients out?
Were you able to make room for more traumas?
Did you call other hospitals?
Have you had training to deal with active shooter events? 
If yes: Was this through your work or another venue? What aspects of the training you had were especially helpful? 
If no: Do you plan on attending training to prepare for this type of event?
Unexpected Outcomes Did anything surprise you about the response?
Some people we have spoken with at various sites have said they know certain hospital guidelines or rules were 
broken to care for patients that day. Are you aware of any hospital rules or guidelines that were broken that day?
Communication How was the communication?
Were there any disruptions or breakdowns?
What would have improved communications?
How was the electronic medical record?
Emotional State Did you feel safe?
Do you think that impacted patient care?
How has your perspective regarding future threats changed?
What impact has the terrorism had on you professionally?
What impact has the terrorism had on you personally? (prompt: Did you do anything differently as a result 
such as changes to how you take care of yourself?)
What would have helped you process the incident?
Did you attend a debriefing?
If yes: What aspects of the debriefing were helpful?
Imagining future scenarios, would you play the same role or would you want to take on a different role?
Would you respond the same way or a different way?
What training or information do you feel you need to do in order to be better prepared next time?
Table 2. Standardized interview guide for mass shooting study.
Our hospital system was overwhelmed. You couldn’t send 
pages. You couldn’t send emails. You couldn’t send out 
announcements because the system was completely clogged.
Security planning is often independent of medical care 
processes. As a result, communication between security and 
the hospital incident command system sometimes lagged. 
Respondents who worked with victim families noted there was 
some confusion about how to confirm family member identities 
and who was allowed to be with the patient. 
Security had earpieces and nobody had access to what 
they’re hearing. They need to be sharing what they’re 
hearing. In the future I hope to get one administrator with the 
same equipment so administration isn’t closed off and we’re 
not left out of that critical information.
The use of social media sometimes added inaccurate 
information and unnecessary stress.
So that was kind of hard because we didn’t know what was 
real and was not real coming in. 
Most clinicians felt prepared due to ongoing training drills. 
ED training is both clinical-role specific, completed 
as a professional requirement, and interprofessional. Some 
respondents had completed active shooter training prior to the 
attack. Prior training had limited influence, however, since the 
attack was technically not an active shooter incident at their 
facilities. 
Most participants said disaster drills were helpful because 
most people knew their role and task. Clinicians knew how to 
form response teams, prepare treatment beds/areas and assemble 
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appropriate equipment. People moved to their roles without 
conflict. Clinicians felt confident and competent to treat patients 
regardless of condition. Two hospitals had recently held drills and 
respondents felt this was a contribution.
You know, I was just prepared for the worst. I didn’t know 
if there were shooters who were going to try and attack the 
hospital. Whatever it was, I was prepared for it. I was good, 
I’m going to protect my staff, I’m going to treat as many 
patients as I possibly can, we are going to do the best we 
can.  I think everyone acted that way.
Respondents identified some training gaps, including 
working with non-clinical administrators and patient/family 
liaisons, increased people in the ED, and how to handle media. 
Some remarked that without media training they had to develop a 
response extemporaneously.
We had a lot of media turning into a circus. So they can 
video off the hospital front and we had patients coming in. 
A nurse mentioned, ‘why don’t we drop blankets and cover 
up patients to protect them from this media circus. These 
patients deserve privacy.’ We surrounded that patient as we 
brought them in and protected their identity.  
Some expressed a desire to understand more about weapons 
and ballistics.  
Especially when the detectives come to talk to you, you’re the 
only access they have to the patient and they’re asking you 
questions that you probably can’t answer because you’re not 
a ballistics specialist. 
Lots of people want to help but they need direction to know where 
to be effective.
Everyone commented on the spontaneous help offered. 
It made me very proud to work here – to be a part of it. To 
see how everybody wanted to help…to see that we were all 
here as a team…was amazing.
For the EDs, that meant doctors and nurses calling to offer 
clinical assistance, as well as local businesses dropping off food 
and water. When a bomb threat was called into one facility a 
local casino security force immediately brought bomb-sniffing 
dogs to the hospital. Those already working stayed significantly 
beyond their shifts. Unexpected help from qualified individuals 
already credentialed to work in the hospital was welcomed and 
represented an extended workforce. Calls came in from hospitals 
in adjacent counties offering operating space. There was a need 
for a better process for integrating (or not) volunteer clinicians 
into patient care in the ED. 
It was crowded with the number of emergency physicians 
and trauma surgeons who were there and so pile on top 
of that people who came down wanting to help who really 
didn’t need to be there. That got in the way a little bit. But I 
think on our side, we did a pretty good job of policing that  I 
mean nobody kicked anybody out, but there could have been 
a way I think to regulate better who was down there. It’s just 
human nature to want to help. It’s hard to be critical of that.
There could be something to the effect of a central station 
where all providers check in and are doled out to certain 
areas. 
I think pairing off worked well when you have sets or surplus 
of staff where you can handle every patient that comes. You 
know, the way we paired off was one trauma attending, and 
one ED attending for each patient. I think that worked very 
well. And because we were so overstaffed accompanying 
those patients up to OR really worked for us. 
The terrorist attack tested limits of responder security, media 
management, securely identifying patient families who should 
have access, and securing places where people might have access 
to view things they should not (i.e., rooftops of buildings). Help 
from outside agencies did provide needed support.
I mean we just felt completely safe. There were people 
everywhere. I knew their job was mainly to protect hospital 
staff but they weren’t just police officers in uniform, they had 
their vests on, their dogs and their guns, and their SWAT 
cars. It was a whole army of people…
Male (n=14) Female (n=12) Total (n=26)
Median 1st Quartile 3rd Quartile Median 1st Quartile 3rd Quartile Median 1st Quartile 3rd Quartile
Age 39.5 36.5 48.0 44.5 39.3 54.8 41.0 37.3 50.8
Years post degree 10.0 5.0 13.0 14.5 9.5 17.8 12.0 6.3 16.5
n % n % n %
MD/DO 12 46 6 23 18 69
Nurse or Admin 2 8 6 23 8 31
MD, Doctor of Medicine; DO, Doctor of Osteopathic Medicine; admin, administration.
Table 3. Demographic characteristics of interview subjects.
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Practical Advice Create separate teams to care for patients already in the emergency department (ED) and the non-MCI patients 
who present to the ED.
Create and distribute a paper list of disaster phone numbers of specific individuals/roles and designation of several 
individuals to serve as runners to communicate with people not immediately reachable by phone.
Recognize the value of social media, especially peer-to-peer/text messaging, and plan for personal phone use 
instead of expecting people to only communicate via specific hospital disaster phones.
Use of personal protective equipment, including gowns, can make it difficult to identify the roles of those providing 
patient care. Using stickers to identify individual roles as physician, nurse, or respiratory therapist, solves this issue.
Integrating blood bank services into the disaster plan to temporarily bring blood supply into the ED while 
maintaining strict protocols.
Encourage IT to plan for significantly increased streaming and Internet usage during MCIs. One hospital had to 
temporarily suspend Internet service because so many people were streaming news on their desktop computers it 
slowed the patient care activities that required IT resources.
Out of concern for bombs or other weapons, decide in advance whether patients will have clothes removed prior to 
entering heavily populated trauma bays.
Work with administrators to limit the number of extra people entering the ED by establishing a check-in system 
for volunteer clinicians. This plan needs to include a central place where people standing by also receive 
communication and updates about the disaster response and needs.
Provide additional security to control who enters the ED, as well as identifying and controlling access to the 
hospital and grounds/parking lots surrounding the area.
Immediately engage media in a single defined location to limit disruptive impact on patient care. Provide a direct liaison 
while remaining in control of where they can park to prevent blocking traffic flow of responders, patients and family.
Establish a liaison to accompany family members of patients. The liaison may assist in obtaining identification, 
communication with providers, and to serve as a shield from media questions until the families are ready to 
manage it themselves.
Develop a plan for debriefing of critical incidents that recognizes the personal and emotional impact on 
clinical responders.
MCI, mass casualty incident; IT, information technology.
Table 4. Practical advice for hospital response to mass casualty incidents.
Most responders were OK bypassing normal processes to 
expedite patient care. 
All of the facilities activated some level of their disaster 
plan. MCIs may create scenarios where bypassing an approved 
process or policy is considered prudent to quickly treat more 
patients effectively. Most respondents reported some kind of 
process deviation and felt that decision was warranted by the 
circumstances.  
I had 3-5 ambulances on delay on the wall; I wanted to 
consolidate patients and have one crew watching patients 
to release the other crews because I didn’t know how 
many patients were trying to get in. I was able to release 
one crew. 
Multiple respondents documented moving patients out 
of the ED to admitted beds upstairs more quickly than the 
norm. In some cases this happened without written orders 
because of lack of access to computers, which is consistent 
with documented MCI responses.4 Additional deviation 
examples included patients taken to the operating room without 
computer physician orders, a blood bank moved to the ED, a 
low-acuity, non-trauma patient discharged without paperwork, 
briefly releasing emergency physicians to accompany patients 
transferring to the OR with surgeons, and transferring patients 
to ICU earlier than usual.
I did find one patient that was in severe respiratory distress. 
So I grabbed one of my emergency residents who was 
superfluous for the traumas and I said, “Do you want to 
intubate or do you want me to?” and he was very happy 
to intubate…then I called the I.C.U. attending and said, “I 
normally stabilize these patients down here for a while. Do 
you mind taking them up right now?” and it was delightful. 
They said, “Sure. Send them right up” even before I had a 
blood gas. 
MCIs have personal and emotional impact on clinical 
responders.
Several respondents reflected on their personal situation 
while providing patient care, which was while the shooter identity 
was unknown and still at large. 
I was scared for my family, honestly but not for anything 
that was happening in the ED or for my own safety. But my 
family’s I was.
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Several had children in schools on lockdown. One facility 
received a bomb threat during this time. Clinicians did not know 
if they were treating victims or the shooter. Most respondents 
were not afraid, and expressed commitment to patient care 
regardless of their personal concerns. 
Fear was not a factor in providing patient care. No one 
retreated, despite the threat of an at-large shooter, several 
physicians provided care in an open area established for 
disasters in the ED parking lot. 
Most respondents said they employed their usual methods to 
deal with stressful days. Others felt that discussing their feelings 
in safe environments was key.
I was uncomfortable being out in large crowds after this. I 
did feel anxious coming into work. So it definitely impacted 
me personally. It hasn’t affected how I do things around 
here, professionally, because I think I can separate that. But 
definitely I do think it has impacted me personally.
I voiced a lot of concerns to my wife.  The thing that may have 
helped … was realizing how much more other people have to 
process, like there was the big shoot-out where the police shot 
the shooters and I’m thinking, I’m coming home to a normal 
life after helping to save this patient, what about those police 
officers? They were just involved in a shoot-out, and killed 
somebody, but in the process probably saved, I don’t know, 
how many other lives?
Debriefing occurred in different settings post event and were 
typically held in conference rooms in the respective hospitals 
or attached campus grounds. Most respondents felt these were 
useful in processing the MCI. Many respondents commented 
that the event resulted in a lingering malaise that was difficult 
to shake for many weeks. Several people expressed gratitude 
for debriefing meetings that were mostly organized by clinical 
leadership and by clinical role (physicians separate from nurses). 
Two people commented they wished the debriefing had happened 
sooner and interprofessionally.
We talked about it amongst emergency physicians, trauma 
surgeons and nursing. I never really go home and think 
about patients ... I’m pretty good at brushing things off. 
Even though the actual patient care was no different than 
what we usually do, the context and knowing that it was 
this mass shooting and everything really sticks with you 
and obviously with all the news coverage and everything 
that occurs afterwards it was something that weighed on 
me for I would say at least a week.
While most felt that debriefing sessions were helpful in 
dealing with the incident, some felt that attending these were 
too painful and made them feel depressed and vulnerable. 
My experience was debrief once and then do not talk about 
it. Forget it. Every time you talk about it, you’re going to 
have a nightmare, that’s what happened to me.
A few respondents felt that everyday security measures could 
be improved.
I think the best thing [hospital] has done is they’ve put in 
those metal detectors just like at the airports.  
Many of the respondents felt a need to enhance their personal 
safety, mentioning being more aware of their surroundings, 
choosing when and where to walk, and considering training and/
or acquisition of firearms. 
I trained my family and my children to stay alert about 
surroundings…We teach them that we live in a different 
world.  These things that are happening, it’s not pretty.  It’s 
not what people should be doing to one another and bad 
things are happening and we need to be aware and protect 
ourselves.
Practical Advice
All respondents offered practical advice for preparing for a 
MCI response. These are summarized in Table 4.
DISCUSSION
Our qualitative study examined a MCI from the perspective 
of clinicians first caring for patients at area hospitals. Our study 
elucidated several themes to help other institutions prepare for 
similar incidents. 
System resilience seemed bolstered by already established 
relationships. People relied on trust already developed from 
working together. They were proud about how a broad network 
of individuals, including prehospital responders, came together 
for a common goal.  Literature documents that working 
together promotes resilience and training drills emphasizing 
“communicating, coordinating, and cooperating” promote social 
relationships because “emotional interaction may have a positive 
influence on team effectiveness.”5,25-27 Community relationships 
were also essential to obtaining water, food, and information. 
People worked at their level of training for the common goal and 
avoided power struggles because they already knew each other 
and what to do.
Social media was a two-sided issue. Consistent with 
similar events, responders used social media news reports 
to make decisions but not all information was accurate.28 
Instead of relying on limited “disaster phones” distributed 
only to leadership, all respondents could group text or receive 
news updates. However, there was no designated authority 
to confirm information accuracy. Individuals made decisions 
based on a combination of their own judgment and leadership 
messages, but everyone yearned for timely, accurate updates. 
The healthcare system should “adopt, use and leverage social 
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media,” but usage standards have not been established and 
are often at odds with the general public who are able to post 
pictures and information in real time that may violate privacy 
standards at care facilities.28
Most interviewees felt safe in the work environment and 
did not feel their fears impacted their work. EDs are high-stress 
environments and workers are often exposed to violent acts 
during their regular work.29 Their reported coping mechanisms 
were consistent with prior research about how protective skills 
and resilience develop after traumatic events. 30 Some described 
ways they were increasing their personal safety independent of 
work, including possible gun acquisition.31 
Based on our interviews, debriefing sessions, in multiple 
contexts and venues, should be available, but not mandatory. 
Hospital disaster plans should include ongoing debriefing 
and counseling access, including individual follow-up with 
non-attenders. Sessions should address common maladies 
such as difficulty sleeping, increased fear and hypervigilance 
reported from other incidents.16 Lingering effects from MCIs 
may be exacerbated by personally knowing the victims and the 
randomness of events (e.g., it might happen again.), and women 
typically report more symptoms.16,32
LIMITATIONS
Study limitations included clinicians who had the strongest 
negative impact from the incident may not have responded to 
our interview requests, which may have resulted in selection 
bias. Most of the interviews were from the Level I trauma center. 
Our sample under-represented nursing and administrative staff. 
The smaller sample size and time lapse between the event and 
interview completion may also hinder validity.
CONCLUSION
This study provides context regarding the response of 
healthcare personnel from multiple institutions to a singular 
terrorist attack in the U.S. While most responders felt prepared, 
non-traditional communication channels, managing volunteer 
assistance, and corralling media presented novel challenges 
not included in current disaster plans. Developing post-event 
debriefing plans that acknowledge personal impact on providers 
should also be a priority. By understanding these common 
experiences, opportunities arise to prepare for future incidents. 
Additionally, knowledge gained from participants sharing their 
best practices allows both an occasion to review and improve 
individual current MCI plans as well as an opportunity to study 
methods described in future events.
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